Springer, Heidelberg (1994)īellovin, S.M.: Problem Areas for the IP Security Protocols., In: Proceedings of the Sixth Usenix Unix Security Symposium (1996)īlake-Wilson, S., Menezes, A.: Unknown key-share attacks on the station-to- station (STS) protocol. ACM Computers and Communications Security conference, CCS (2002), īellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Entity authentication and key distribution.
This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.Īiello, B., Bellovin, S., Blaze, M., Canetti, R., Ioannidis, J., Keromytis, A., Reingold, O.: Efficient, DoS-Resistant Secure Key Exchange for Internet Protocols. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. In particular, it is shown how SIGMA solves some of the security shortcomings found in previous protocols. We motivate the design of SIGMA by comparing it to other protocols, most notable the STS protocol and its variants. This paper describes the design rationale behind the SIGMA approach and protocols, and points out to many subtleties surrounding the design of secure key-exchange protocols in general, and identity-protecting protocols in particular. In particular, SIGMA serves as the cryptographic basis for the signature-based modes of the standardized Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol (versions 1 and 2). As a consequence, the SIGMA protocols are very well suited for use in actual applications and for standardized key exchange.
The SIGMA protocols provide perfect forward secrecy via a Diffie-Hellman exchange authenticated with digital signatures, and are specifically designed to ensure sound cryptographic key exchange while providing a variety of features and trade-offs required in practical scenarios (such as optional identity protection and reduced number of protocol rounds). We present the SIGMA family of key-exchange protocols and the “SIGn-and-MAc” approach to authenticated Diffie-Hellman underlying its design.
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